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Asymptotic Optimality in Byzantine
Distributed Quickest Change Detection
Yu-Chih Huang, Yu-Jui Huang, and Shih-Chun Lin
Abstract
The Byzantine distributed quickest change detection (BDQCD) is studied, where a fusion center
monitors the occurrence of an abrupt event through a bunch of distributed sensors that may be com-
promised. We first consider the binary hypothesis case where there is only one post-change hypothesis
and prove a novel converse to the first-order asymptotic detection delay in the large mean time to a
false alarm regime. This converse is tight in that it coincides with the currently best achievability shown
by Fellouris et al.; hence, the optimal asymptotic performance of binary BDQCD is characterized. An
important implication of this result is that, even with compromised sensors, a 1-bit link between each
sensor and the fusion center suffices to achieve asymptotic optimality. To accommodate multiple post-
change hypotheses, we then formulate the multi-hypothesis BDQCD problem and again investigate the
optimal first-order performance under different bandwidth constraints. A converse is first obtained by
extending our converse from binary to multi-hypothesis BDQCD. Two families of stopping rules, namely
the simultaneous d-th alarm and the multi-shot d-th alarm, are then proposed. Under sufficient link
bandwidth, the simultaneous d-th alarm, with d being set to the number of honest sensors, can achieve
the asymptotic performance that coincides with the derived converse bound; hence, the asymptotically
optimal performance of multi-hypothesis BDQCD is again characterized. Moreover, although being
shown to be asymptotically optimal only for some special cases, the multi-shot d-th alarm is much
more bandwidth-efficient and energy-efficient than the simultaneous d-th alarm. Built upon the above
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2success in characterizing the asymptotic optimality of the BDQCD, a corresponding leader-follower
Stackelberg game is formulated and its solution is found.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of quickest change detection (QCD), a.k.a. sequential change detection, studies
detecting an abnormal event as quickly as possible after its occurrence at a deterministic but
unknown time, subject to a certain false alarm rate. It has many applications and has been
extensively researched since the early works [3], [4], [5]. In these works, it is assumed that
there is only one post-change hypothesis, which we refer to as the binary case. When there
are multiple post-change hypotheses, the problem is referred to as multi-hypothesis QCD and
has been investigated in [6], [7]. A nice tutorial on QCD can be found in [8]. However, recent
applications of cyber-physical systems (CPS) [9] typically involve multiple distributed sensors
monitoring the event and reporting their observations to the fusion center via bandwidth-limited
links. For example, the abnormal changes of voltage waveforms in smart grids are harmful
to delicate electronic devices and recent advances of massive machine-type communications
(mMTC) or internet of things (IoT) [10] allow the usage of advanced cyber-physical infrastruc-
tures for monitoring voltage quality events distributively [11]. Moreover, some sensors, whose
identities are unknown to the fusion center, may be compromised and may try to sabotage the
detection task. Motivated by these applications, this paper considers the decentralized version of
QCD, where a fusion center monitors the event through distributed sensors, with compromised
sensors collaboratively forming attack. This problem has been studied in [12], [13] and is called
Byzantine distributed QCD (BDQCD).
In [12], a special case of binary BDQCD, only one compromised sensor is considered. A de-
cision rule called second-alarm rule, where the fusion center declares the occurrence of the event
once it receives the second local report from sensors, is proposed and its asymptotic performance
is analyzed. In [13], the general binary BDQCD problem with infinite-bandwidth links and that
with 1-bit links are investigated. Multiple rules are proposed and their corresponding asymptotic
performance are analyzed. In the presence of infinite-bandwidth links, the low-sum CUSUM
scheme proposed in [13] achieves the best asymptotic performance among the schemes in [13].
Among the rules with 1-bit links proposed in [13], the voting rule that declares the occurrence of
the event after the number of received local reports exceeds a certain threshold has the best first-
3order asymptotic performance. When the threshold is set to be the total number of honest sensors,
the asymptotic performance of the voting rule, called the consensus rule in this special case,
reaches its maximum and also attains the best asymptotic performance in [13]. Two questions
naturally arise from this premise:
1) What is the fundamental limit of the first-order asymptotic performance of binary BDQCD?
2) How to handle this problem when there are multiple post-change hypotheses?
For the first question, despite the exciting results in [12], [13], it is thus far unclear what the
best first-order asymptotic performance of binary BDQCD is. Although one non-trivial converse
can be easily obtained by assuming that a genie reveals to the fusion center the identities of all
honest sensors (this simple converse will be presented in Section III), this converse bound and
the best achievable asymptotic performance in [13] do not match. This indicates that either the
best achievable scheme thus far is not optimal or the converse is not tight, or both.
The first contribution of this work is to prove a new converse to the first-order asymptotic
performance for binary BDQCD. In the proof, we first construct an attack strategy for the com-
promised sensors and then construct a genie who reveals just enough information to the fusion
center. After that, inspired by the proof technique in [14], we transform the original problem
into a centralized QCD problem. Last, evaluating the corresponding optimal CUSUM procedure
establishes the new converse. The converse turns out to coincide with the best achievable first-
order asymptotic performance known to date; thereby, the fundamental limit of the first-order
asymptotic performance of binary BDQCD is characterized. Specifically, our converse confirms
that both the consensus rule (using only 1-bit links) and the low-sum-CUSUM rule (using infinite-
bit links) in [13] achieve the optimal first-order scaling. The first optimality unveils an important
implication that, at least asymptotically, 1-bit links suffice even with compromised sensors. As
a byproduct of our proof, we explicitly construct an attack strategy, called the reverse attack,
where each compromised sensor generates fake i.i.d. observations according to post-change and
pre-change distributions before and after the change time (i.e., with pre-change and post-change
distributions swapped), and form local reports based on these fake observations. In spite of
abandoning potential cooperation among compromised sensors, this reverse attack turns out
to be strong enough for us to prove a tight lower bound on the asymptotic performance of
4BDQCD1. We note that although our converse is inspired from [14], the one-shot hypothesis
testing problem studied in [14] is fundamentally different to our sequential change detection that
deals with observation sequences having an unknown change time. More detailed comparisons
with [14] are provided at the end of Section IV-B.
Our second contribution is to tackle the second question listed above and extend the framework
of BDQCD to the multi-hypothesis setting. To this end, we formulate the multi-hypothesis version
of the BDQCD problem. We then demonstrate that blindly adopting the existing procedure
in [7][13][15] may result in catastrophic events. Two novel stopping rules are proposed and
analyzed, which requires log(Q)-bit and Q-bit noiseless links, respectively, for BDQCD with
Q+1 hypotheses. In our delay analysis, we prove an asymptotic dominance result, which confirms
the intuition that although there are multiple hypotheses, for each one being considered, we only
have to examine the statistics of another hypothesis that is closest (in the sense of KullbackLeibler
(KL) divergence) to the hypothesis being considered. The converse for the binary case is also
extended to the multi-hypothesis setting and it is shown that proposed stopping rules can achieve
the optimal first-order asymptotic performance under different bandwidth constraints; therefore,
the asymptotically optimal performance of multi-hypothesis BDQCD is again characterized.
Last but not least, we formulate a leader-follower Stackelberg game [16] where the fusion
center and honest sensors form the leader while the compromised sensors form the follower.
The first-order optimality mentioned above yields the game solution, where the leader adopts the
aforementioned asymptotically optimal stopping rule and the follower employs the corresponding
worst attack.
A. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We will separately introduce the problem of
binary BDQCD and multi-hypothesis BDQCD in Sections II-A and II-B, respectively, and review
the current state-of-the-art in Section III. We will then split our discussion into two parts, namely
the binary BDQCD in Section IV and multi-hypothesis BDQCD in Section V, even though the
former is a special case of the latter. The main reasons are: 1) binary BDQCD is of substantial
interest in its own right and has been a subject of research in the literature [12], [13], 2) due
1Throughout the paper, such an attack strategy is said to be an asymptotically worst (to the fusion center) attack, or simply
a worst attack.
5to the nature of having multiple post-change hypotheses, one has to consider a sequence of
stopping times, which is in sharp contrast to binary BDQCD where only one stopping time is
considered, 3) our proofs for tight converse bounds in Sections IV and V are quite involved with
heavy notations and it is better to start with the binary case in Section IV and mention only
notable differences later in Section V, and 4) for achievability, we borrow existing results in [13]
for the binary BDQCD, while we devise new efficient stopping rules for the multi-hypothesis
BDQCD whose first-order asymptotic performance coincides with our converse bound. Finally,
a leader-follower Stackelberg game and its solution are then presented in Section VI.
B. Notational conventions
For a positive integer K, define [K] := {1, . . . , K} and [K]+ = {0} ∪ [K]. Function (x)+
outputs x if x ≥ 0 and zero otherwise. For two real functions f1(x) and f2(x), as x→ ∞, we
write f1(x) ∼ f2(x) when f1(x)/f2(x) → 1 and f1(x) & f2(x) when lim inf(f1(x)/f2(x)) ≥ 1.
The o(.) and w(.) follow the asymptotic notations in [17].
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formally state the problem of BDQCD. We will first describe binary
BDQCD and then formulate the generalization to the multi-hypothesis case.
A. Binary BDQCD
The binary BDQCD problem consists of a fusion center and K sensors indexed by [K].
Among these sensors, there is an unknown subset N ⊂ [K] of honest sensors, with the remaining
M := K − |N | sensors being potentially compromised. The goal of the honest sensors is to
monitor an event and help the fusion center decide whether the event has occurred, while the
goal of compromised sensors is to collaboratively confuse the fusion center. Although the exact
information about which sensors are honest and which sensors are compromised is unknown,
we assume that M , the maximum number of sensors the attacker can compromise, is known by
the fusion center. Moreover, it is assumed that there are more honest sensors than compromised
sensors, i.e., |N | > M . The observations of all K sensors are sequences of independent random
variables with known distributions, subject to the same distribution change at an unknown but
deterministic time ν. Before the change time ν, sensor k’s observations Xk1 , X
k
2 , . . . , X
k
ν are
6independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with the density P0, while X
k
ν+1, X
k
ν+2, . . . are
i.i.d. with the density P1. If the change never happens, i.e., ν = ∞, Xkt are i.i.d. with P0 for
all t. We denote by Xt = [X
1
t , X
2
t , . . . , X
K
t ] the collection of observations at time t and we use
the notation Xt2t1 for t1 < t2 to denote the collection [Xt1 ,Xt1+1, . . . ,Xt2 ]. Also, we define the
KL divergence from P0 to P1 as [18] to be I :=
∫
log
(
P1(x)
P0(x)
)
P1(x)dx. Throughout the paper,
we assume that I is finite and strictly positive and∫
log (P1(x)/P0(x))
2 P1(x)dx <∞. (1)
All the local reports from honest or compromised sensors belong to the set X , which satisfies
the underlying bandwidth constraint on the noiseless link between each sensor and the fusion
center. It is worth emphasizing that this setting encompasses many scenarios discussed in existing
works including X = {0, 1} and X = R in [13] and X being a set of finite alphabets in [19].
At each time index t, the honest sensor k individually makes a local decision by mapping its
own observations up to time t to an element in X , and then chooses to report it or not according
to the adopted reporting mechanism. Based on the received local reports from all sensors, the
fusion center adopts a stopping rule to determine when to declare that the event has occurred.
A change detection rule includes such a stopping rule and local rules at honest sensors. The
M compromised sensors, on the other hand, try to disrupt/confuse the fusion center by sending
attack signals in X . We assume a very powerful attacker that knows the exact change-time
ν and has access to the current and past observations of all nodes. The symbols sent by the
compromised sensors at time t are then produced by g, a function (called an attack strategy)
with inputs ν, Xt1, and the change detection rule. We denote by G the set of all attack strategies
including all possible g with no more than M compromised sensors. Following [13], we analyze
the performance of a rule by its worst-case expected detection delay and mean time to a false
alarm in the sense of Lorden [4], under the worst attack strategy among G. Specifically, let T
be the stopping time of a rule, we define the performance metrics as follows.
• Detection Delay: The worst-case mean detection delay
D[T ] := sup
g∈G,ν
ess supEgν [(T − ν)+|Xν1], (2)
where Egν [.] means the expectation is taken w.r.t. P0 when t ≤ ν and w.r.t. P1 when t > ν
under the attack strategy g ∈ G.
7• False Alarm: Without any abnormal changes (i.e. ν =∞), the worst-case mean time to a
false alarm is
A[T ] := inf
g∈G
E
g
∞[T ], (3)
where Eg∞[.] means the expectation is w.r.t. P0 for all t (i.e., ν = ∞) under the attack
strategy g ∈ G.
The main theme of this paper is to investigate the optimal asymptotic behavior of how the
expected detection delay scales with the mean time to a false alarm in the worst case. Specifically,
for an optimal BDQCD rule with stopping time T satisfying A[T ] ≥ γ, we want to characterize
how D[T ] grows with γ as γ →∞.
Remark II.1. We would like to emphasize that our setting is slightly different from that in
[13]. In [13], among honest sensors, some are affected and some are unaffected by the change.
Similar scenarios with no Byzantine attack are also considered in the literature, with exactly
one unknown sensor [20], [21] or a subset of all sensors [22], [23] being affected. For the
unaffected, their observations are sampled i.i.d. from P0 even after the change. In this paper,
we do not consider unaffected sensors purely to avoid heavy notation. With slight modifications,
our results can be easily extended to include unaffected sensors. This statement remains true
even for the multi-hypothesis setting discussed later.
B. Multi-Hypothesis BDQCD
For the multi-hypothesis version of BDQCD, we again consider a network with a fusion
center and K distributed sensors. There is an unknown subset N ⊂ [K] of honest sensors, with
the remaining M := K − |N | sensors being compromised. The fusion center tries to monitor
an abrupt event and decide whether the event has occurred regardless of which type it is2.
The observations of all K sensors are sequences of independent random variables with known
distributions, subject to the same distribution change at an unknown but deterministic time ν.
After this distribution change, there are Q different possible types. Specifically, let P0 be the pre-
change probability density function (PDF) and P1, . . . , PQ the post-change PDF corresponding
to the states 1, . . . , Q, respectively. For each k ∈ [K], we denote by Xkt the observation made
2This is aligned with [6], [7] . In many applications, once a change has been detected, the operator can respond to it quickly
and find out which type it is.
8by sensor k at time t. We can now define Q + 1 different hypotheses as follows. Under the
hypothesis Hq, q ∈ [Q], the random variables Xk1 , Xk2 , . . . , Xkν are i.i.d. with the PDF P0, while
Xkν+1, X
k
ν+2, . . . are i.i.d. with the PDF Pq. Under the hypothesis H0, X
k
t are i.i.d. with the
PDF P0 for all t. We write Xt = [X
1
t , . . . , X
K
t ] for each t and denote by X
t2
t1 the collection of
Xt1 ,Xt1+1, . . . ,Xt2 for each t1, t2 with t2 > t1.
As the binary case, there is a noiseless link of a finite or infinite number of bits associated
with each sensor to the fusion center. At each time t, an honest sensor k makes a local decision
individually by mapping its own observations up to time t to an element in X satisfying
the bandwidth constraint. Depending on the adopted reporting mechanism and the bandwidth
constraint, each sensor decides whether it should alarm the fusion center through the channel it
is associated with. The M compromised sensors, on the other hand, try to disrupt/confuse the
final decision of fusion center by sending attack signals which again belong to X .
As [6], [7], let us define the sequence of alarm times 0 = T0 < T1 < T2 < . . . < Tρ < . . . ,
where Tρ is the alarm time using sensor observations after previous alarm time Tρ−1, that is,
XTρ−1+1,XTρ−1+2, . . .; then the stopping time for type q ∈ [Q] is defined as
T q = inf
ρ≥1
{Tρ : qˆρ = q}, (4)
where qˆρ is the decision at the fusion center declared at time Tρ. Here, we use the convention
inf{∅} = ∞ and it is possible that T q = ∞, which corresponds to the case when the fusion
center never declares change of type q. With a little abuse of notation, when only the first alarm
time T1 of a rule T matters, we sometimes simply write T1 as T . Let g be an attack strategy of
the M compromised sensors. We assume that the attacker knows ν, Xt1, and the global decision
rule (including both the stopping rule at the fusion center and local rule at each sensor), and
hence g is a function of these arguments. We also write g = ∅ when all the compromised sensors
are absent. When a change under hypothesis Hq, q ∈ [Q], happens at time ν and the strategy
employed by the M compromised sensors is g, the underlying probability measure is denoted by
P
q,g
ν . Moreover, when no change ever happens, i.e., ν = ∞, we denote by Pq=0,g∞ the underlying
probability measure.
Following the single-sensor case [6], [7], we define the performance metrics as follows:
• Detection Delay: The worst-case mean detection delay is given by
D[T ] := sup
q∈[Q]
sup
g,ν
ess supEq,gν [(T − ν)+|Xν1], (5)
9• False Alarm or False Isolation: The worst-case mean time to a false alarm or a false
isolation is given by
A[T ] := inf
q∈[Q]+
inf
g
inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
E
q,g
0 [T
qˆ]. (6)
Our objective is again to design fault-tolerant decision rules such that D[T ] can be minimized,
with large A[T ] ≥ γ.
Remark II.2. The detection delay defined in [6], [7] for the scenario with one single honest
sensor is given by
sup
q∈[Q]
sup
ν
ess supEqν [T − ν|T > ν,X11 , . . . , X1ν ], (7)
where X11 , . . . , X
1
ν are the observations of the (single and honest) first sensor up to time ν. One
may notice that (5) is not quite of the same form as the above definition. In Lemma A.1 in
Appendix A, we prove that even with multiple honest and compromised sensors, these two forms
are equivalent and one is free to work with either of them.
Before leaving this section, we quickly review the asymptotically optimal matrix CUSUM
algorithm in [7] when there is just a single honest sensor |N | = 1,M = 0, and Q ≥ 1. For
each hypothesis q ∈ [Q], this honest sensor (with index k = 1) computes the CUSUM statistics
Y kt (q, j) for every j 6= q ∈ [Q]+ at time t, recursively through Y k0 (q, j) = 0 and
Y kt (q, j) =
(
Y kt−1(q, j) + ℓ
k
t (q, j)
)+
, (8)
where ℓkt (q, j) = log
Pq(Xkt )
Pj(Xkt )
is the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) between Pq and Pj . The results are
put into a Q×Q matrix Yt with the qth row given by
Y
k
t := [Y
k
t (q, 0), · · · , Y kt (q, j), · · · , Y kt (q, Q)]. (9)
Let Y kt,q = minj∈[Q]+, j 6=q Y
k
t (q, j) be the minimum of the qth row. The matrix CUSUM procedure
in [7] locally determines that the event has occurred at the first time that any Y kt,q, q ∈ [Q] exceeds
a pre-defined threshold h. A hard decision is then alarmed, which means that the procedure
terminates after this alarm and no other decisions will be further made.
III. PRIOR WORK
In this section, we review some prior results directly relevant to the present work. We again
split our discussion into the binary and multi-hypothesis cases.
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A. Binary BDQCD
For the considered binary BDQCD problem with |N | = 1 and M = 0 (i.e., no compromised
sensor and thereby no Byzantine attack), the problem reduces to the standard QCD problem for
which it was shown in [4], [5] that Page’s CUSUM procedure Tsingle [3] achieves the optimal
scaling that for A[Tsingle] = γ, the expected detection delay scales like D[Tsingle] ∼ log(γ)/I
as γ → ∞. For M = 0 and general |N |, Mei in [19] developed a scheme Tconsensus, called
the consensus rule, where each sensor performs CUSUM according to its local observations and
sends a binary report to the fusion center, which declares the occurrence of the event when all the
|N | sensors simultaneously say so. It was then shown in [19] that this scheme is asymptotically
optimal that under A[Tconsensus] = γ, the expected detection delay scales like
D[Tconsensus] ∼ log(γ)|N |I , as γ →∞. (10)
In [15], Banerjee and Fellouris proposed two families of stopping rules for the same M = 0
and general |N | case. In the first family of stopping rules, which we refer to as the one-shot
d-th alarm, each sensor performs the CUSUM procedure locally and only reports an alarm once
at the first time the local CUSUM statistic exceeds a predefined threshold; the fusion center
then stops and declares the event as soon as receiving d ≤ |N | reports. In the second family of
stopping rules, which is referred to as the d-voting rule, each sensor again performs the CUSUM
procedure locally but gets to report multiple times whenever the local CUSUM statistic exceeds
the threshold. The fusion center then stops and declares the event as soon as receiving d ≤ |N |
reports simultaneously. The authors of [15] analyzed the second-order asymptotic performance
and the results revealed that even though it was shown in [19] that the d-voting rule with d = |N |
(i.e., the consensus rule) achieves the first-order asymptotic performance, it might be better in
practice for it to wait for only the majority of sensors’ reports, i.e., setting d = ⌈(|N |+ 1)/2⌉.
Very recently, in [13], binary BDQCD with general |N | and M was discussed and multiple
schemes were analyzed. Among these schemes, the d-voting rule τ(d), achieves the best scaling
when d = |N | is chosen3. Specifically, it was shown in [13] that the following asymptotic
performance can be achieved:
3This is also called the consensus rule in [13]. But it is noted that here, we only wait for |N |, the number of honest sensors,
responses rather than all K responses.
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Theorem III.1 ([13, Theorem 26]). Let d be an integer satisfyingM < d ≤ |N |. ForA[τ(d)] = γ,
the worst-case mean detection delay of the d-voting rule scales like
D[τ(d)] ∼ log γ
(d−M)I , as γ →∞. (11)
The best asymptotic performance reported in [13] is the above one with d = |N | (i.e.,
the consensus rule), which also coincides with another scheme in [13], low-sum-CUSUM that
requires infinite bandwidth. This leads us to conjecture that (11), with d = |N |, is the optimal
first-order behavior. A tight converse is then necessary to verify this conjecture.
We would like to point out that a non-trivial converse can be obtained by revealing the identities
of all |N | honest sensors and using the asymptotic optimality in [19], as detailed below.
Theorem III.2 (Simple converse). For any binary BCQCD rule T , withA[T ] ≥ γ, the worst-case
mean detection delay meets
D[T ] & log γ|N |I , as γ →∞. (12)
Unfortunately, this converse is not tight compared to (11).
B. Multi-hypothesis BDQCD
To the best of our knowledge, the present work is the first to formulate and study the multi-
hypothesis BDQCD. Prior to this work, the single honest sensor QCD problem with multiple
hypothesis was first investigated in [6], in which Nikiforov extended Lorden’s framework to
include multiple post-change hypotheses. Nikiforov in [6] also proposed an algorithm based
on the concept of generalized likelihood ratio and showed the asymptotic optimality of this
algorithm. In [7], by cleverly switching the order of max and min in the algorithm in [6],
Oskiper and Poor developed the matrix CUSUM algorithm that admits a recursive formula
and hence can be efficiently implemented. Moreover, it was shown that, in addition to its low
complexity, the matrix CUSUM procedure is also asymptotically optimal.
IV. BINARY BDQCD
We consider the problem of binary DBQCD in this section. We first present the main result,
that is, a tight converse to the first-order asymptotic performance of the worst-case detection
delay, in Section IV-A. The proof of the main result is then given in Section IV-B.
12
BDQCD
BDQCD with
reverse attack
Genie-aided
BCQCD
Transformed
QCDTheorem 3
Sec. IV-B1
Sec. IV-B3
Sec. IV-B2
Sec. IV-B4Non-Byzantine QCD
and
Fig. 1. Diagram of proof steps.
A. Main results of this section
Here, we present the main result of this section, which is a new converse of the first-order
asymptotic performance of BDQCD.
Theorem IV.1 (Tight converse). For any binary BDQCD rule T , with A[T ] ≥ γ, the worst-case
mean detection delay is lower bounded as
D[T ] & log γ
(|N | −M)I , as γ →∞. (13)
A sketch of the proof of the new converse is outlined in Fig. 1 and the details are given in
the next subsection. To prove this theorem, we first note that if the optimal asymptotic scaling
is lower bounded by η(γ) under an attack strategy, then it is also lower bounded by η(γ)
under the worst attack. We thus proceed by constructing an attack strategy in Section IV-B1,
called the reverse attack, which is later shown to be an asymptotically worst attack. We then, in
Section IV-B2, construct a genie providing the identities of |N | −M out of |N | honest sensors
and the local observations used for generating the local report at every sensor. After that, by
absorbing the impact of the reverse attack into pre/post-change distributions, the problem is
transformed into an equivalent centralized QCD problem in Section IV-B3 for which CUSUM
is known to be optimal. Finally, in Section IV-B4, evaluating the CUSUM procedure for the
transformed problem reveals the connection to another non-Byzantine QCD with only |N |−M
honest sensors.
When comparing the main result of this section presented above and the achieviability result
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Theorem III.1, one immediately characterizes the optimal first-order behavior of binary BDQCD
as follows.
Corollary IV.1. For an optimal binary BDQCD rule T ∗, subject to A[T ∗] ≥ γ, the first-order
asymptotic worst-case mean detection delay is given by
D[T ∗] ∼ log γ
(|N | −M)I , as γ →∞. (14)
Remark IV.1. Supposed that, as in [13], there is a subset B ⊆ N such that only sensors in B
are affected by the change and those in N \B have observations drawn i.i.d. according to P0 all
the time. We can slightly alter our genie in our proof so that it reveals the identities of |B|−M
affected sensors and the |N \B| unaffected sensors. One can then follow the same technique to
prove the following converse,
D[T ] & log γ
(|B| −M)I , as γ →∞. (15)
Moreover, setting d = |B| in the d-voting rule achieves the above first-order scaling; hence, the
optimal first-order asymptotic performance of this setting is also characterized as
D[T ∗] ∼ log γ
(|B| −M)I , as γ →∞. (16)
B. Proof of the converse for binary BDQCD
The proof presented in this section follows closely the steps shown in Fig. 1.
1) The reverse attack: For the ease of presentation in this proof, we define P0,1 = P0 and
P1,1 = P1. Recall that each honest sensor k’s observation sequenceX
k
t is drawn i.i.d. according to
P0,1 before the change time ν and i.i.d. according to P1,1 after ν. We construct an attack strategy
as follows. For each compromised sensors k′, it generates a fake observation sequence Xk
′
t ,
which is then input to the assigned local decision function for forming the fake report. The fake
observation sequence is generated i.i.d. according to P0,2 and P1,2 before and after the change
time ν, respectively. That is, the compromised sensors form fake reports according to observations
based on wrong distributions. To establish the tight converse, we will set P0,2 = P1,1 = P1 and
P1,2 = P0,1 = P0 in the very end of the proof; therefore, we call this attack strategy the “reverse
attack”. However, most of the steps in the proof stay valid for general densities P0,2 and P1,2.
Next, we will show that under this reverse attack, for any detection rule with mean time to a
false alarm no less than γ, the mean detection delay is lower-bounded by the RHS of (13). Note
that by definition, the worst case delay in (2) will also be lower-bounded by (13) automatically.
14
2) Genie-aided Byzantine centralized QCD: First note that the worst case happens when there
are M compromised sensors. Also since the identities of the sensors are unknown, the fusion
center cannot enhance the worst-case performance by selectively accepting reports. If the fusion
center accepts reports from K − K ′, K ′ ≤ |N |, sensors only, in the worst case, the problem
reduces to the BDQCD withM compromised sensors and |N |−K ′ honest sensors, which results
in a worse performance. Moreover, when K ′ > |N |, we are left with only compromised sensors
in the worst case, which is obviously worse than accepting all reports. We therefore only have
to consider the fusion center taking reports from all K sensors for detection in what follows.
The K sensors are divided into three groups. Each of the first two groups consists of M
sensors, while the last group contains |N |−M sensors. All sensors in the first and third groups
are honest, while those in the second group are compromised. Assume that there is a genie
giving away the identities of |N |−M honest sensors to the fusion center. For the rest M honest
sensors and M compromised sensors, the identities are unknown to the fusion center. Without
loss of generality, we assume that sensors in the first two groups have indices [2M ]. We also
give the observations used at each sensor (fake observations if the sensor is compromised) for
generating its local report and the densities P0,2 and P1,2 to the fusion center. Let s : [K]→ [2]
be a function that assigns each sensor to index 1 or 2 (meaning “honest” or “compromised”)
in such a way that exactly M out of the first 2M sensors are assigned to index 2, and the last
|N |−M sensors are all assigned to index 1. Let S be the collection of all possible assignments
s. Clearly, there are total |S| = (2M
M
)
such assignments. For θ ∈ {0, 1}, the product density
under the compromised group assignment s is
Pθ,s(Xt) =
2M∏
k′=1
Pθ,s(k′)(X
k′
t )
K∏
k=2M+1
Pθ,1(X
k
t ). (17)
Now, we are facing a composite change detection problem, which we refer to as genie-aided
Byzantine centralized QCD (BCQCD). Before the change time ν, the random vectorsX1,X2, . . . ,Xν
are i.i.d. over time with density P0,s while Xν+1,Xν+1, . . . are generated with density P1,s,
for some s ∈ S. In this genie-aided version, the fusion center knows everything about the
compromised sensors except for their exact locations. With slight abuse of notations, as (2), the
mean detection delay of this problem is given by
Dgenie[T ] := sup
s∈S,ν
ess supEsν [(T − ν)+|Xν1]; (18)
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a) First 2M sensors under assignment {1, 2, 2, 1}
Pθ,1 Pθ,2 Pθ,2 Pθ,1 Pθ,1 Pθ,1
b) First 2M sensors under assignment {1, 1, 2, 2}
Pθ,1 Pθ,1 Pθ,2 Pθ,2 Pθ,1 Pθ,1
Fig. 2. An example of genie-aided BCQCD with |N | = 4 and M = 2 under two different assignments. Here, empty circles
and crossed circles are honest and compromised sensors under the assignment s, respectively, and thus follow Pθ,1 and Pθ,2,
respectively. Moreover, gray circles are those honest sensors whose identities are revealed to the fusion center by the genie;
thereby, their observations follow Pθ,1 always, regardless of assignment.
also as (3), the mean time to false alarm is
Agenie[T ] := inf
s∈S
E
s
∞[T ]. (19)
Example IV.1. An example of genie-aided BCQCD with |N | = 4 honest sensors and M = 2
compromised sensors is provided in Fig. 2. In this figure, we use empty circles, crossed circles,
and gray circles to represent honest sensors, compromised sensors, and honest sensors whose
identities are revealed by the genie, respectively. The distribution that each sensor’s observation
follows under hypothesis θ ∈ {0, 1} is presented. In both Fig. 2-a) and Fig. 2-b), we note that the
last |N |−M = 2 sensors are always honest and their identities are revealed to the fusion center.
Hence, their observations always follow Pθ independently. For the first 2M = 4 sensors, the
distributions under assignments {1, 2, 2, 1} and {1, 1, 2, 2} are shown in Fig. 2-a) and Fig. 2-b),
respectively. We note that there are total
(
2M
M
)
= 6 different assignments and we only show 2 of
them for demonstration.
3) Transformed Centralized QCD: We transform the genie-aided BCQCD problem into an
equivalent centralized QCD problem for which CUSUM is known to be optimal. Recall that
unlike [14], now only 2M sensors’ identities are unknown to the fusion center and we define
“masked”-symmetric strategy as follows. Let τ2M (Xt) be the masked ordering map that puts the
first 2M elements of its input Xt in descending order while keeps the other |N | −M positions
unchanged. A decision rule T (.) of the genie-aided BCQCD problem is said to be masked
16
symmetric if it can be represented as T ({Xt}t≥1) = T˜ ({τ2M(Xt)}t≥1) for some decision rule
T˜ .
In the transformed centralized QCD problem, the fusion center observes X˜t = τ2M(Xt) at
time t. Let P˜θ(X˜t) be the density of τ2M (Xt), where Xt is generated according to density
Pθ,s, θ ∈ {0, 1}. Before the change, the observations {X˜t} follow P˜0 while after the change,
they follow P˜1. Also,
P˜θ(X˜t) =
∑
Xt:τ2M (Xt)=X˜t
Pθ,s (Xt) , (20)
where the equality follows from that the absolute value of the Jacobian of a permutation is
always 1. Following the proof of part 1 of [14, Lemma 4.1], we can easily show that for all
assignments s ∈ S, the density P˜θ(X˜t) does not depend on s. Suppose the change occurs at
the time ν. Under hypothesis H˜1, the random vectors X˜1, X˜2, . . . , X˜ν are drawn i.i.d. over time
with density P˜0 while X˜ν+1, X˜ν+2, . . . are generated i.i.d. with density P˜1. Under hypothesis H˜0,
there is no change, i.e. ν =∞, and X˜t are drawn i.i.d. with density P˜0 for all t.
We first focus on a masked symmetric rule T , and show that the detection delay of the genie-
aided BCQCD is identical to that of the transformed QCD problem, defined as Dtrans[T˜ ] :=
supν ess supEν [(T˜ −ν)+|X˜ν1]. Compared to the transformation in the one-shot hypothesis testing
[14], our delay in (18) involves all pre-change observations by taking an essential supreme over
the distributions of them. This difference complicates the transformation. Specifically, we will
show
Dgenie[T ] = sup
s∈S,ν
ess supEsν [(T˜ ({τ2M(Xt)}t≥1)− ν)+|Xν1]
(a)
= sup
ν
ess supEν [(T˜ ({X˜t}t≥1)− ν)+|X˜ν1] = Dtrans[T˜ ]. (21)
The first equality is from the definition in (18) and we will devote ourselves to proving equality
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(21a). To this end, note that
E
s
ν [(T˜ ({τ2M(Xt)}t≥1)− ν)+|Xν1]
=
∞∑
z=0
1− P
((
T˜ ({τ2M (Xt)}t≥1)− ν
)+
≤ z∣∣Xν1
)
=
∞∑
z=0
1−
∫
1{
(T˜ ({τ2M (xt)}t≥1)−ν)
+
≤z
}
ν+z∏
t=ν+1
P1,s(xt)dx
ν+z
ν+1
(a)
=
∞∑
z=0
1−
∫
1{
(T˜ ({x˜t}t≥1)−ν)
+
≤z
}
ν+z∏
t=ν+1
P˜1(x˜t)dx˜
ν+z
ν+1
=
∞∑
z=0
1− P
((
T˜ ({X˜t}t≥1)− ν
)+
≤ z∣∣X˜ν1
)
=Eν [(T˜ ({X˜t}t≥1)− ν)+|X˜ν1], (22)
where P is the associated probability measure and 1{.} is the indicator function; and (a) follows
from the change of variables in integration [24] and the fact that P˜1(.) does not depend on s.
Now, for a fixed ν and for each s ∈ S, let Ps and P˜ denote the probability measures on RK×ν
with densities specified by (17) and (20) with θ = 0, respectively. To establish (21a), observe
that for any x ∈ RK×ν, from (22), we have
E
s
ν [(T˜ ({τ2M (Xt)}t≥1)− ν)+|Xν1](x) =
Eν [(T˜ ({X˜t}t≥1)− ν)+|X˜ν1](τ2M(x)). (23)
Let DM denote ess supE
s
ν [(T˜ ({τ2M(Xt)}t≥1)− ν)+|Xν1] where the essential supremum is taken
under Ps. By definition, there exists Ω ⊆ RK×ν with Ps(Ω) = 1 such that
DM ≥ Esν [(T˜ ({τ2M (Xt)}t≥1)− ν)+|Xν1](x)
for all x ∈ Ω. By (23), we have
DM ≥ Eν [(T˜ ({X˜t}t≥1)− ν)+|X˜ν1](τ2M (x)), ∀x ∈ Ω.
Note that
P˜(τ2M (Ω)) =
∫
τ2M (Ω)
P˜0(y)dy =
∫
Ω
P0,s(x)dx = P
s(Ω) = 1,
where the densities P˜0 and P0,s are given by (20) and (17) respectively. We therefore conclude
that DM ≥ ess supEν [(T˜ ({X˜t}t≥1)−ν)+|X˜ν1] where the essential supremum here is taken under
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P˜. Noting that this is true for every s ∈ S gives the relation “≥” in (21a). By using the same
argument as above, but switching the roles of the left-hand side and right-hand side of (21a),
we obtain the relation “≤”.
We have shown that the detection delay of genie-aided BCQCD (18) is equal to that of
transformed QCD under masked symmetric rules. One can similarly prove that the mean time
to false alarm Agenie[T ] in (19) is equal to that of the new problem Atrans[T˜ ] := E∞[T˜ ]. The rest
is to show that for any fusion rule T ′(.), there is a masked symmetric rule T (.) that is not worse
than T ′(.). This is shown in Lemma A.2 in Appendix and then the transformation of QCD is
established.
4) Establishing the converse: Let T ∗, T ∗genie, and T
∗
trans be optimal stopping rules for BDQCD,
genie-aided BCQCD, and transformed QCD, respectively. So far, we have established the fol-
lowing relationships among the aforementioned problems
D[T ∗] ≥ Dgenie[T ∗genie] = Dtrans[T ∗trans], (24)
and
A[T ∗] ≤ Agenie[T ∗genie] = Atrans[T ∗trans]. (25)
We can therefore establish a converse bound by evaluating the performance of the transformed
QCD, which is a standard QCD problem with observations following P˜0 and P˜1 before and after
the change point ν, respectively. For such the problem, it is well known from [5], [19, Lemma
2] that an optimal strategy is Page’s CUSUM procedure given by σ˜(h) = inf{t ∈ N : Y˜t ≥ h},
where Y˜t = (Y˜t−1 + ℓ˜t)
+ with Y˜0 = 0, and from (20)
ℓ˜t = log
∑
Xt:τ2M (Xt)=X˜t
P1,s(Xt)∑
Xt:τ2M (Xt)=X˜t
P0,s(Xt)
= log
∑
π∈Π2M
P1,s(π(X˜t))∑
π∈Π2M
P0,s(π(X˜t))
= log
∑
π∈Π2M
P1,s◦π−1(X˜t)∑
π∈Π2M
P0,s◦π−1(X˜t)
(a)
= log
∑
s′∈S P1,s′(X˜t)
2M !
(2MM )∑
s′∈S P0,s′(X˜t)
2M !
(2MM )
. (26)
where π : [K]→ [K] is a masked permutation function that permutes the first 2M entries while
keeps the remaining |N |−M entries unchanged, Π2M is the collection of all (2M ! in total) such
π, and ◦ is the function composition operator; (a) follows from the fact that for a compromised
group assignment s, summing over all the permuted versions s ◦ π−1 is equivalent to summing
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over all the assignments s′ with each s′ being involved 2M !/
(
2M
M
)
times. In what follows, we
set P0,2 = P1,1 and P1,2 = P0,1 according to the reverse attack described in Sec. IV-B1. We now
rewrite the likelihood in (26) as
ℓ˜t = log
∑
s∈S P1,s(X˜t)∑
s∈S P0,s(X˜t)
(27)
(a)
= log
(∑
s∈S
∏2M
k′=1 P1,s(k′)(X˜
k′
t )
)∏K
k=2M+1 P1,1(X˜
k
t )(∑
s∈S
∏2M
k′=1 P0,s(k′)(X˜
k′
t )
)∏K
k=2M+1 P0,1(X˜
k
t )
(b)
= log
∏K
k=2M+1 P1,1(X˜
k
t )∏K
k=2M+1 P0,1(X˜
k
t )
, (28)
where (a) follows from (17) and (b) is because of the fact that for every s, there exists a s¯ such
that s¯(k′) = 2 whenever s(k′) = 1 and s¯(k′) = 1 whenever s(k′) = 2; therefore,
∑
s∈S
2M∏
k′=1
P1,s(k′)(X˜
k′
t ) =
∑
s∈S
2M∏
k′=1
P0,s¯(k′)(X˜
k′
t )
=
∑
s¯∈S
2M∏
k′=1
P0,s¯(k′)(X˜
k′
t ), (29)
where the first equality is from P1,1 = P0,2 and P1,2 = P0,1. Note that when k = 2M + 1 . . .K,
X˜kt is equal to the honest observation X
k
t in the BCQCD before transformation. Hence, the
optimal test reduces to the standard centralized CUSUM procedure for the change detection
with |N | −M honest sensors. Applying the results in [19] then shows (13).
5) Discussions: A byproduct obtained along the proof is that the “reverse attack” proposed
in Section IV-B1 is an asymptotically worst attack for the original BDQCD problem. This
observation is further exploited using the game theory, as described in Lemma VI.1 and Theorem
VI.1 of Section VI.
Note that although the idea of the transformation in Sec. IV-B3 is inspired by [14], our proofs
presented above are quite different. In [14], all sensors’ identities are not revealed to the fusion
center, while it is essential for us to construct a strong, but not so powerful, genie that reveals
identities of some sensors for proving a tight converse, as in Sec. IV-B2. This new genie is the
key to validate (28) in Sec. IV-B4, which shows that the optimal test under the proposed reverse
attack constructed in Sec. IV-B1 only relates to the revealed |N |−M honest sensors. Furthermore,
the transformation in Sec. IV-B3 is more involved than that in [14]. The difficulty comes from
the fundamental difference between the one-shot hypothesis testing problem in [14] and our
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sequential change detection that deals with observation sequences with an unknown change
time. Finally, in the coming Section V-B, we extend our converse to the multiple-hypothesis
case and face new challenges compared with the binary hypothesis problem in [14].
V. MULTI-HYPOTHESIS BDQCD
In this section, we consider the multi-hypothesis BDQCD. Again, we first present our main
result of this section in Section V-A, which is the characterization of the asymptotic performance
of the worst-case detection delay subject to a mean time to a false alarm or a false isolation.
We then prove a converse for the considered problem in Section V-B, followed by the proposed
stopping rules and their performance analysis in Section V-C. Throughout the section, we define
for each pair of q, j ∈ [Q]+, q 6= j, the KL divergence from Pj to Pq as
I(q, j) :=
∫
log (Pq(x)/Pj(x))Pq(x)dx. (30)
Let σ2(q, j) be the second moment of I(q, j) defined as
σ2(q, j) := Eq
[(
log
(
Pq(x)
Pj(x)
)
− I(q, j)
)2]
. (31)
We then make the following assumption:
Assumption V.1. For any q ∈ [Q],
(i) 0 < I(q, j) <∞ and σ2(q, j) <∞, ∀j ∈ [Q]+, j 6= q.
(ii) Let Iq := min0≤j≤Q, j 6=q I(q, j). Assume I
q admits a unique minimizer j∗q ∈ [Q]+ \ {q}.
Now, consider q = 0.
(iii) We define I0 := min1≤j≤Q I(j, 0), and assume that I
0 admits a unique minimizer j∗0 ∈ [Q].
A. Main results of this section
Our first result for multi-hypothesis BDQCD with Q+1 hypotheses is the characterization of
the converse as follows.
Theorem V.1. Consider the multi-hypothesis BDQCD with Q + 1 hypotheses. For any rule T
with A[T ] ≥ γ, the worst-case mean detection delay is lower bounded as
D[T ] & log γ
(|N | −M)I∗ , as γ →∞. (32)
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where
I∗ = min
q
Iq = min
q∈[Q]
min
j∈[Q]+\{q}
I(q, j) (33)
This converse can be proved in a similar way to Theorem IV.1; hence, we only list the major
differences between the two proofs in Section V-B.
For the achievability, we propose in Section V-C a family of stopping rules, called the
simultaneous d-th alarm τ s(d), and show that this stopping rule achieves the first-order scaling of
(32) when d is set to be |N |. This simultaneous d-th alarm rule requires each sensor to send a
Q-bit signal constantly through the noiseless link to the fusion center. To reduce the demanding
bandwidth and energy requirements, another family of stopping rules, called multi-shot d-th
alarm τm(d), is proposed in Section V-C. This rule is more economic in that it only requires
the sensor sending ⌈log2Q⌉-bit signal occasionally. In what follows, we present the asymptotic
performance of the two proposed families of rules and refer the reader to Section V-C for their
proofs.
Theorem V.2. With the wort-case mean time to a false alarm or isolation no smaller than than
γ, we have
(a) among the proposed simultaneous d-th alarm rule τ s(d), the best first-order asymptotic worst-
case mean detection delay is achieved when d = |N | and is given by
D[τ s(|N |)] .
log γ
(|N | −M)I∗ , as γ →∞; (34)
(b) among the proposed multi-shot d-th alarm rule τm(d), the first-order asymptotic worst-case
mean detection delay when d ≥M + 1 is given by
D[τm(d)] .
log γ
I∗
, as γ →∞. (35)
Combining the results in Theorems V.1 and V.2, we arrive at the following result of the optimal
scaling for multi-hypothesis BDQCD with Q+ 1 hypotheses.
Corollary V.1. For multi-hypothesis BDQCD with Q+ 1 hypotheses and the number of honest
sensors |N | ≥ M + 1, if the noiseless link of each sensor can support (at least) Q bits, the
first-order asymptotic worst-case mean detection delay of an optimal stopping rule T ∗ subject
to A[T ∗] ≥ γ is precisely
D[T ∗] ∼ log γ
(|N | −M)I∗ , as γ →∞. (36)
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Moreover, if |N | = M + 1, the optimal scaling
D[T ∗] ∼ log γ
I∗
, as γ →∞, (37)
can be achieved by a stopping rule that requires only ⌈log2Q⌉-bit links.
B. Proof of Theorem V.1, the converse for multi-hypothesis BDQCD in Theorem V.2
For extending the converse from the binary case to the multi-hypothesis case with Q + 1
hypotheses, we encounter two main challenges. First, the asymptotically worst attack adopted
in the binary case, namely the reverse attack, cannot be straightforwardly applied. As there are
Q post-change distributions, we have to carefully choose one of them for swapping in order to
make the attack strategy asymptotically worst. Second, after we manage to construct the attack
strategy and complete the transformation, there are Q+1 hypotheses in the transformed QCD and
hence Q2 LLRs (see (8)) to be tracked in the asymptotically optimal matrix CUSUM procedure.
It is difficult to make each LLR relate to only observations of (a subset of) honest sensors as
we have done in (28) for the binary case.
In what follows, to solve the first issue, we modify the reverse attack in upcoming Section
V-B1 by swapping the P0 with the post-change distribution that is closest to P0 in the sense of
having the minimum KL divergence. To circumvent the second issue, we abandon the approach
of evaluating the optimal detecting procedure in Section IV-B4 and directly perform the delay
analysis based on [6, Theorem 2].
1) The reverse attack for (Q+1)-hypotheses: To prove this converse, under the true hypothesis
Hq, q ∈ [Q]+ (defined in Section II-B), we define Pq,1 = Pq. The distribution Pq,2 for fake
observation in the proposed attack strategy is constructed as follows. Let qm = argq∈[Q]+ min Iq,
with the corresponding j∗qm defined in Assumption V.1 (ii) and (iii). We define
Pq,2 =


Pj∗q , if q 6= j∗qm ,
Pqm , if q = j
∗
qm .
(38)
The main intuition behind this choice is that we want the compromised sensors to follow the
distribution that is closest to the true one under the KL divergence. This is done in the first
case above. For the exception in the second case, i.e., q = j∗qm , it is for having the symmetry
Pj∗qm ,2 = Pqm and Pqm,2 = Pj∗qm , which will become handy later in the proof.
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2) Genie-aided Byzantine centralized (Q + 1)-hypotheses QCD: To establish the tight con-
verse, we assume that a genie gives the fusion center the identities of |N |−M out of |N | honest
sensors. Without loss of generality, we let these |N |−M sensors have the indices 2M+1, . . . , K,
respectively. The genie also provides the fusion center with the observations used at each sensor
for generating its local reports. Similarly to (17) in the binary case, with the help of this genie,
the problem becomes the genie-aided BCQCD with distribution for each q ∈ [Q]+ as
Pq,s(Xt) =
2M∏
k′=1
Pq,s(k′)(X
k′
t )
K∏
2M+1
Pq,1(X
k
t ). (39)
For this genie-aided BCQCD, replacing g ∈ G with s ∈ S in (5) and (6), we obtain the detection
delay and mean time to a false alarm or a false isolation given by
Dgenie[T ] = sup
q∈[Q]
sup
s∈S,ν
ess supEq,sν [(T − ν)+|Xν1], (40)
and
Agenie[T ] = inf
q∈[Q]+
inf
s∈S
inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
E
q,s
0 [T
qˆ], (41)
respectively.
3) Transformed Centralized (Q + 1)-hypotheses QCD: We can now follow the proof of
the binary case to transform the genie-aided BCQCD into a multiple-hypothesis QCD having
distributions generalizing (20) as
P˜q(X˜t) =
∑
Xt:τ2M (Xt)=X˜t
Pq,s(Xt), (42)
where q ∈ [Q]+ and τ2M is again the masked ordering map. Let us define the KL divergence
between transformed distributions P˜q and P˜j for q ∈ [Q] and j ∈ [Q]+ as
I˜(q, j) =
∫
log
(
P˜q(x˜)
P˜j(x˜)
)
P˜q(x˜)dx˜. (43)
Moreover, let I˜∗q = minj∈[Q]+\{q} I˜(q, j) and
I˜∗ = min
q∈[Q]
I˜∗q = min
q∈[Q]
min
j∈[Q]+\{q}
I˜(q, j). (44)
Note that in the binary case (24), we have shown that the transformed QCD would have
the same detection delay with the genie-aided BCQCD for any post-change distribution P1.
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Extending from the binary case (18) to the multi-hypothesis case (40), we just need to take an
additional supremum over all post-change distributions Pq, q ∈ [Q]; therefore, the equivalence
Dgenie[T ∗genie] = Dtrans[T ∗trans]
:= sup
q∈[Q]
sup
ν
ess supEqν
[(
T ∗trans({X˜t}t≥1)− ν
)+ ∣∣∣∣X˜ν1
]
, (45)
still holds under multiple hypotheses for optimal rules T ∗genie and T
∗
trans in genine-aided BCQCD
and transformed QCD, respectively.
Regarding the mean time to a false alarm or false isolation, it is a bit more involved than the
proof for detection delay since in addition to false alarm considered in Section IV-B3, we also
need to deal with false isolation. We again first focus on a masked symmetric rule T satisfying
T ({Xt}t≥1) = T˜ ({τ2M (Xt)}t≥1) for some rule T˜ . We aim to prove
Agenie[T ] = Atrans[T˜ ] (46)
Consider Agenie[T ] in (41), for each q ∈ [Q]+ and s ∈ S, we have
inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
E
q,s
0 [T
qˆ] = inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
E
q,s
0
[
inf
ρ≥1
Tρ
1{qˆρ=qˆ}
]
= inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
∞∑
z=0
1− P
(
inf
ρ≥1
Tρ
1{qˆρ=qˆ}
≤ z
)
, (47)
where the first equality is from (4) and the convention a/0 := ∞ for positive a ∈ R. Observe
that
P
(
inf
ρ≥1
Tρ
1{qˆρ=qˆ}
≤ z
)
=
∫
1{
infρ≥1
Tρ({Xt}t≥1)
1{qˆρ=qˆ}
≤z
}
z∏
t=1
Pq,s(xt)dx
z
1
=
∫
1{
infρ≥1
T˜ρ({τ2M (Xt)}t≥1)
1{qˆρ=qˆ}
≤z
}
z∏
t=1
Pq,s(xt)dx
z
1. (48)
Plugging (48) into (47), then (47) equals to
inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
∞∑
z=0
1−
∫
1{
infρ≥1
T˜ρ({X˜t}t≥1)
1{qˆρ=qˆ}
≤z
}
z∏
t=1
P˜q,s(x˜t)dx˜
z
1
= inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
∞∑
z=0
1− P
(
inf
ρ≥1
T˜ρ
1{qˆρ=qˆ}
≤ z
)
= inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
E
q,s
0
[
inf
ρ≥1
T˜ρ
1{qˆρ=qˆ}
]
= inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
E
q,s
0 [T˜
qˆ]. (49)
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Taking infimum over q ∈ [Q]+ and s ∈ S on the above shows (46) for a masked symmetric
rule T . In Lemma A.3, we show that it suffices to consider masked symmetric rules as for any
general rule T ′, there exists a symmetrized rule which is not worse than it in Agenie[T ′].
We have extended (25) and again shown that Agenie[T ∗genie] = Agenie[T ∗trans] for optimal rules
T ∗genie and T
∗
trans in the multi-hypothesis cases and completed the transformation. To establish
the converse, we now provide a converse to the asymptotic performance of the transformed
QCD in Lemma A.4. That is, the first-order scaling of an optimal stopping rule T ∗QCD with
Atrans[T ∗QCD] ≥ γ is given by
Dtrans[T ∗QCD] ∼
log γ
I˜∗
. (50)
4) Establishing the converse by evaluating the transformed delay: To establish the converse,
we now look into the structure of I˜∗ in (50), which is defined in (44). First, we note from
(42)-(43) that for any pair of hypothesis indexes (q, j)
I˜(q, j) =
∫
log
(∑
x:τ2M (x)=x˜
Pq,s(x)∑
x:τ2M (x)=x˜
Pj,s(x)
)
P˜q(x˜)dx˜
(a)
=
∫
log


∑
s∈S Pq,s(x˜)
2M !
(2MM )∑
s∈S Pj,s(x˜)
2M !
(2MM )

 P˜q(x˜)dx˜
(b)
=
∫
log


∑
s∈S
∏2M
k′=1 Pq,s(k′)(x˜
k′) 2M !
(2MM )∑
s∈S
∏2M
k′=1 Pj,s(k′)(x˜
k′) 2M !
(2MM )

 P˜q(x˜)dx˜
+
∫
log
(∏K
2M+1 Pq,1(x˜
k)∏K
2M+1 Pj,1(x˜
k)
)
P˜q(x˜)dx˜
(c)
=
∫
log
(
Pˆq,s(x˜
1, . . . , x˜2M )
Pˆj,s(x˜1, . . . , x˜2M)
)
Pˆq,s(x˜
1, . . . , x˜2M)dx˜1 . . . dx˜2M
+
∫
log
(∏K
2M+1 Pq,1(x˜
k)∏K
2M+1 Pj,1(x˜
k)
)
P˜q(x˜)dx˜
(d)
≥
∫
log
(∏K
2M+1 Pq,1(x˜
k)∏K
2M+1 Pj,1(x˜
k)
)
K∏
2M+1
Pq,1(x˜
k)dx˜2M+1 . . . dx˜K
=
K∑
k=2M+1
∫
log
(
Pq,1(x
k)
Pj,1(xk)
)
Pq,1(x
k)dxk
(e)
= (|N | −M)I(q, j), (51)
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where (a) follows from the same steps reaching (26), that is,∑
x:τ2M (x)=x˜
Pq,s(x) =
∑
s∈S
Pq,s(x˜)
2M !(
2M
M
) ; (52)
(b) is because of the independence in (39); (c) holds by P˜q(x˜) equals to (52) and marginalizing
x˜2M+1, . . . , x˜K out for the first integration, where we define a new PDF
Pˆq,s(x˜
1, . . . , x˜2M ) =
∑
s∈S
2M∏
k′=1
Pq,s(k′)(x˜
k′)
2M !(
2M
M
) ; (53)
(d) follows by noting that the first integration in (c) is the KL divergence between Pˆq,s and
Pˆj,s, which is always non-negative [18], together with marginalizing x˜
1, . . . , x˜2M in the second
integration and the fact that the sensors in the third group are always honest in (42) (see (39));
and (e) follows from the selection of reverse attack in Section V-B1 and definition (30). Now,
recall qm = argq min Iq . For the pair (qm, j
∗
qm) defined in Section V-B1, besides the inequality
in (51), we can further show the following equality
I˜(qm, j
∗
qm) =
∫
log
(∑
s∈S Pqm,s(x˜)∑
s∈S Pj∗qm ,s(x˜)
)
P˜qm(x˜)dx˜
(a)
=
∫
log
(∏K
2M+1 Pqm,1(x˜
k)∏K
2M+1 Pj∗qm ,1(x˜
k)
)
K∏
2M+1
Pq,1(x˜
k)dx˜2M+1 . . . dx˜K
=
K∑
k=2M+1
∫
log
(
Pqm,1(x
k)
Pj∗qm ,1(x
k)
)
Pqm,1(x
k)dxk
= (|N | −M)I(qm, j∗qm) = (|N | −M) min
q∈[Q]
Iq, (54)
where equality (a) follows from the symmetry enforced in the second case of the reverse attack
in (38) and the steps for reaching (28). More specifically, in (51 b)
∑
s∈S
2M∏
k′=1
Pqm,s(k′)(x˜
k′) =
∑
s∈S
2M∏
k′=1
Pj∗qm ,s(k′)(x˜
k′)
from Pqm,1 = Pqm = Pj∗qm ,2 and Pqm,2 = Pj∗qm = Pj∗qm ,1. Now plugging (51) and (54) into (44)
shows that
I˜∗ = (|N | −M)I∗, (55)
since (|N | −M)I∗ ≤ (|N | −M)I(q, j) ≤ I˜(q, j), ∀q, j. Noting that D[T ] ≥ Dtrans[T ∗QCD] ∼
log γ
(|N |−M)I∗
under A[T ] ≥ r, as γ →∞, it completes the proof of the converse part.
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C. Proof of the acheivability for multi-hypothesis BDQCD in Theorem V.2
Now, we first describe the local decision rule at each honest sensor, and then propose two
global fault-tolerant decision rules for the acheivability in part (a) and (b) of Theorem V.2
respectively.
1) Local decision rule: “Soft” Matrix CUSUM: Since the honest sensors are not allowed
to cooperate with each other, it is natural to adopt the matrix CUSUM algorithm reviewed in
Section II-B. Note that for the original matrix CUSUM in [7], since there is only one honest
node, it makes perfect sense for the procedure to make a hard decision and terminate after the
alarm; however, in our setting, the task is not done yet until the fusion center has determined the
occurrence of the event. Therefore, we adapt the matrix CUSUM procedure to the “soft” version
as follows. Whenever a Y kt,q under (9) exceeds the threshold h at time index t, the hypothesis Hq
is softly decided by informing the fusion center that this hypothesis is acceptable at the sensor
k. Now each honest sensor may keep monitoring the event and report multiple hypotheses to the
fusion center. Later in Sec. V-C3, this soft version will help us resolve the “undecidable event”,
which disables the fusion center to make a conclusive decision.
Formally, for the soft matrix CUSUM procedure, a hypothesis Hq is acceptable by the node
k at time
σqk(h) := inf
{
t ∈ N : Y kt,q ≥ h
}
. (56)
In contrast, for the original matrix CUSUM [7], a hypothesis Hq is hard decided at time σ
q
k(h)
if σqk(h) equals to
σk(h) := min
qˆ∈[Q]
σqˆk(h) and q = argmax
qˆ∈[Q]
(
Y kt,qˆ|t=σk(h)
)
.
2) Global fault-tolerant decision rules: As a baseline, the one-shot rule which uses the original
matrix CUSUM is first introduced as
One-shot d-th alarm: This family of rules is a direct extension of the one-shot rule for the binary
case in [13], [15] to the multi-hypothesis setting. Each sensor adopts the original matrix CUSUM
[7] as its local report mechanism and reports the first acceptable non-zero hypothesis as soon as
the sensor finds it. The fusion center declares that an abrupt event has occurred at the first time
that a hypothesis, say Hq, has received d local reports. It also declares that the hypothesis Hq
is true.
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Now, we propose two rules based on the “soft” matrix CUSUM.
i) Multi-shot d-th alarm τm(d)(h): This family of rules requires each sensor to adopt the soft
version of matrix CUSUM and to alarm whenever a hypothesis Hqˆ, qˆ ∈ [Q], is acceptable.
Formally, for each k ∈ N , sensor k reports Hqˆ at the time index σqˆk(h), for every qˆ ∈ [Q]. In
this reporting mechanism, we stipulate that for each sensor, every hypothesis can be reported at
most once, and a reported hypothesis cannot be withdrawn. In other words, once reported by a
sensor, a hypothesis will be promoted as a candidate by that sensor ever since. If a tie happens at
an honest node k, then all the hypothesis indexes have the same σqˆk(h) will be reported one after
another, starting from the one with the largest Y kt,qˆ. For the case where two or more hypotheses
have the same Y kt,qˆ, we break the tie randomly. Consecutive ties and/or multi-way ties can be
easily resolved by equipping each node with a queue of size Q−1 and clearing the queue on the
first-come first-serve basis. The fusion center declares that an abrupt event has occurred at the
first time that a hypothesis, say Hq, has been deemed acceptable by d sensors. It also declares
that the hypothesis Hq is true.
ii) Simultaneous d-th alarm τ s(d)(h): Each sensor constantly transmits Q bits local decision at
time index t to indicate whether Hqˆ is acceptable, ∀qˆ ∈ [Q]. The fusion center declares that
an abrupt event of type q has occurred at the first time that a hypothesis, say Hq, has been
simultaneously accepted by no less than d sensors.
We note that the three families of rules have different bandwidth and/or energy requirements.
The one-shot scheme is the most bandwidth- and energy-efficient one as it requires each link to
support ⌈log2Q⌉ bits and this link is used only once. The multi-shot scheme also requires links
to support ⌈log2Q⌉ bits, but each link may be used up to Q times. As for the simultaneous rule,
it requires each link to support Q bits and each link is constantly used. Also, it is worth noting
that the soft matrix CUSUM reduces to the original CUSUM adopted in [13] when Q = 1,
i.e. binary hypothesis. Thus, the proposed multi-shot and simultaneous d-th alarm include the
one-shot and voting rules in [13], [15] as special cases, respectively. Moreover, depending on
the application at hand, the fusion center can opt to stop only once or multiple times. When
the fusion center chooses to stop only once as [13], Tρ = ∞ in (4) for ρ > 1. For the scenario
where the fusion center makes multiple alarms, it restarts with the same global decision rule
after each alarm at Tρ. Our upcoming Proposition V.1 applies to both scenarios.
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3) Performance analysis: We now carry out the worst-case analysis on the performance of the
multi-shot d-th alarm and simultaneous d-th alarm rules. For the one-shot d-th alarm, we point out
a notable difference from the binary counterpart [13] which significantly degrade the performance
from the converse in Theorem V.1. The undecidable event may happen: it is possible that there
is no non-zero hypothesis index with enough local alarms for making a decision, even though
all honest sensors have raised alarms; thereby, the detection delay is infinity. Unfortunately, even
more advanced multi-shot d-th alarm can only achieve the converse when |N | = M + 1 from
the upcoming analysis. When |N | = M+1, if the one-shot d-th alarm is used, the compromised
sensors can easily trigger the undecidable event.
To further characterize (5) and (6) for the two proposed rules, we will prove asymptotic
dominance results in upcoming Lemma V.1, which greatly simplifies the delay analysis. Intu-
itively, although there are multiple sensors and Q+ 1 hypotheses, for each honest sensor being
considered, we only have to examine the statistics between the q-th hypothesis and the one that
is “closest” to q, for every q ∈ [Q]. Note that this intuition also comply with our asymptotic
converse. Before introducing Lemma V.1 and the complete analysis, some definitions and a
proposition regarding the compromised sensors will be provided first. Similarly to [13], from
(56), we define the ordered time indexes σq(1)(h) ≤ . . . ≤ σq(|N |)(h), for all q ∈ [Q], over |N |
honest sensors as if there is no compromised sensor, for softly deciding hypothesis Hq (cf. the
qth row of CUSUM matrix (9)) We also let Sqℓ (h) be the first time that the hypothesis Hq is
simultaneously softly-decided by ℓ honest sensors, defined as
inf
{
t ∈ N :Y kt,q ≥ h ∀k ∈L, for someL⊂ [N ], |L| = ℓ
}
. (57)
Finally, we will use Eqν to represent the expectation when the change with hypothesis index q
happens at time ν and the compromised sensors are absent.
To continue the worst-case analysis in (5) and (6), recall that all the compromised sensors
know the actual ν and the actual hypothesis q. They can then collaboratively attack/confuse
the fusion center. Thus, it is obvious that choosing any d ≤ M is bad for false alarm or false
isolation in (6), while any d > |N | is bad for detection delay in (5). We therefore confine the
choice of d to some reasonable region and obtain the following result.
Proposition V.1. Fix h > 0. For any positive integer Q, and d ∈ {M+1, ..., |N |}, for multi-shot
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d-th alarm, we have
A[τm(d)(h)] ≥ min
q∈[Q]+
min
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
E
q,∅
0 [σ
qˆ
(d−M)(h)], (58)
D[τm(d)(h)] ≤ max
q
E
q,∅
0 [σ
q
(d)(h)] +Q− 1; (59)
while for simultaneous d-th alarm
A[τ s(d)(h)] ≥ min
q∈[Q]+
min
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
E
q,∅
0 [S
qˆ
d−M(h)]; (60)
D[τ s(d)(h)] ≤ max
q
E
q,∅
0 [S
q
d(h)]. (61)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Based on Proposition V.1, in what follows, we provide explicit upper bounds on the detection
delay. Lemma V.1 is shown first, which states that for each hypothesis q ∈ [Q], although there
are total Q+1 hypotheses, one only has to worry about the one that is “closest” to q in terms of
the KL divergence. By writing Pq for P
q,g=∅
0 and recall the definition of j
∗
q in Assumption V.1,
we have:
Lemma V.1. Suppose h is large enough and Assumption V.1 holds. For any q ∈ [Q], it holds
Pq-a.s. that
(i) The first time Hq is softly decided at the honest sensor k, σ
q
k(h) in (56), equals to
σ
q,j∗q
k (h) := inf{t ∈ N : Y kt (q, j∗q ) ≥ h}. (62)
(ii) For any |N | ≥ d ≥ 1, the first time Hq is simultaneously softly-decided by d honest sensors,
Sqd(h), equals to
S
q,j∗q
d (h) := inf
{
t ∈ N : Y (|N |−d+1)t (q, j∗q ) ≥ h
}
, (63)
where Y
(1)
t (q, j
∗
q ) ≤ . . . ≤ Y (|N |)t (q, j∗q ) are the ordered CUSUM statistics of Y kt (q, j∗q ), for
hypotheses q and j∗q at time t.
Proof: See Appendix C.
We are now ready to present the results on the asymptotic delay performance. Let Z(1), Z(2),
. . . , Z(|N |) be the order statistics of independent standard normal random variables. For each
d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |N |}, we denote by ξd the expected value of Z(d). Moreover, for each q ∈ [Q],
we set Dqd:|N | := ξd
√
σ2(q,j∗q )
Iq
.
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Theorem V.3. Suppose Assumption V.1 holds. As h → ∞, for any q ∈ [Q] and 1 ≤ d ≤ |N |,
we have
E
q,∅
0 [σ
q
(d)(h)] =
h
Iq
+Dqd:|N |
√
h(1 + o(1)), (64)
and the detection delay of the multi-shot d-th alarm in (59) is upper-bounded as
D[τm(d)(h)] ≤ max
q
(
h
Iq
+Dqd:|N |
√
h(1 + o(1))
)
. (65)
Proof: See Appendix D.
Theorem V.4. Suppose Assumption V.1 holds. As h → ∞, for any q ∈ [Q] and 1 ≤ d ≤ |N |,
we have
E
q,∅
0 [S
q
d(h)] ≤
h
Iq
+Dqd:|N |
√
h(1 + o(1)), (66)
and the detection delay of the simultaneous d-th alarm in (61) is upper-bounded as
D[τ s(d)(h)] ≤ max
q
(
h
Iq
+Dqd:|N |
√
h(1 + o(1))
)
. (67)
Proof: See Appendix D.
The asymptotic performance of the mean time to false alarm/isolation of the proposed families
of rules are given in the following.
Theorem V.5. Fix h > 0. If M < d ≤ |N |, the mean time to a false alarm or a false isolation
A[τm(d)(h)] in (58) for the multi-shot d-th alarm is lower-bounded by
d−M
(d−M + 1)

 |N |
d−M


−1
d−M
exp(h). (68)
Proof: See Appendix E.
Theorem V.6. Fix h > 0. If M < d ≤ |N |, the mean time to a false alarm or a false isolation
A[τ s(d)(h)] in (60) is lower-bounded by
1
2

 |N |
d−M


−1
exp ((d−M)h) . (69)
Proof: See Appendix E.
Although the delay upper bounds in Theorems V.3 and V.4 are identical, we will show the
superiority of the simultaneous rule when detection delay and mean time to false alarm/isolation
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are jointly considered, which also validates Theorem V.2. For simultaneous d-th alarm τ s(d)(h),
one can ensure A[τ s(d)](h) ≥ γ from (69) by selecting local threshold
1
d−M

log γ + log

2

 |N |
d−M





 . (70)
Also by plugging h in (70) into (67), with γ →∞,
D[τ s(d)(h)] . max
q
(
log γ
(d−M)Iq
)
. (71)
Then part (a) of Theorem V.2 is valid since d = |N | minimizes the right hand side above.
Moreover, for the multi-shot d-th alarm τm(d)(h), one can ensure A[τm(d)(h)] ≥ γ from (68) by
selecting local threshold
h = log γ +
1
d−M log

 |N |
d−M

+ log(d−M + 1
d−M
)
. (72)
Plugging h in (72) into (65) and let γ →∞, we have
D[τm(d)(h)] . max
q
(
log γ
Iq
)
. (73)
This validates part (b) of Theorem V.2.
Remark V.1. Apart from being the building block of our proof, Lemma V.1 also reveals another
practical benefit. It basically confirms that for large h, for each row of the matrix CUSUM, i.e.,
each abnormal hypothesis Hq, an honest sensor only has to compute and update the CUSUM
statistics Y kt (q, j
∗
q ). This is particularly useful in applications where sensors are subject to
stringent energy constraints. Moreover, although Lemma V.1 only shows asymptotic optimality of
this approach, we provide in Fig. 3 an example showing that the intuition of updating only the
closest hypothesis also applies to small h. In this example, we consider Q = 2 with P0, P1, P2 the
PDFs of Gaussian random variables with means 0, 1,−1 and same variances σ2, respectively.
Instead of the original CUSUM matrix, we use the following reduced one
Y kt (1, 0) ∞
∞ Y kt (2, 0).

 (74)
As shown in Fig. 3, the detection performances of full CUSUM matrix and the reduced one are
almost identical, as expected.
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Fig. 3. Detection delay of full Matrix CUSUM and that of the reduced one in (74) for an honest sensor. The local threshold
is set such that exp(h) = 104 (h ≈ 9.21) and each curve is calculated based on 20000 realizations.
VI. GAME-THEORETIC FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate a leader-follower Stackelberg game [16, Section 3.6] for the
considered BDQCD, where the fusion center and honest sensors act as the leader and the
compromised sensors act as the follower. It turns out that the characterization of the first-order
optimality in the previous sections will help us characterize the Stacklberg equilibrium.
In the game, the information available to the two players are as follows:
• The follower knows the leader’s strategy g1, all the current and past local observations X
t
1,
the change time ν, and the actual hypothesis.
• The leader is oblivious of the exact indexes of compromised sensors, but knows the maxi-
mum number of compromised sensors M .
Now we define the strategy spaces of the two players. With Q + 1 hypotheses, we assume the
noiseless link of each sensor can support (at least) Q bits and use the K × 1 vector λˆt ∈ ZK2Q
to denote the Q-bit local decisions at time t, where Z2Q is the integer ring modulo 2
Q. The
compromised sensors cooperatively form the attack vector et ∈ ZK2Q which has at most M non-
zero components, reflecting that there are at most M compromised sensors. At time t, the fusion
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center receives
λˆt + et, (75)
where the addition is over Z2Q . A strategy g1 of the leader at time t includes a local decision
rule that maps Xk1 , . . . , X
k
t into the kth entry of λˆt at each sensor k ∈ [K] (the leader treats
all K sensors as honest), and a stopping rule at the fusion center which maps K × t matrix
[λˆ1 + e1, . . . , λˆt+ et] to a decision qˆt ∈ [Q]+. An alarm is fired if qˆt 6= 0. The stopping time for
type q ∈ [Q] is given in (4) and again let T be the first alarm time. A strategy g2 of the follower
at time t is the vector et in (75), where all K elements are from Z2Q but elements in a subset
of indices with size |N | (corresponding to indexes of honest sensors) is deterministically 0. We
use G1 and G2 to denote the pure-strategy spaces of aforementioned g1 and g2, respectively.
We first focus on the binary case as in Section IV, i.e., Q = 1, and refer to the game as the
binary BDQCD Stackelberg game. From the detection delay in (2) and false alarm in (3), we
define the corresponding performance metrics under strategies (g1, g2) as
D(g1, g2) := sup
ν
ess supEg2ν [(T − ν)+|Xν1], and
A(g1, g2) := Eg2∞[T ], (76)
respectively, where we note that the stopping time T is a function of (g1, g2). Since we wish the
mean time to false alarm to be larger than a given γ, the cost for the leader is then defined as
J1(g1, g2) , lim
γ→∞
(D(g1, g2)
log γ
+ I− (γ −A(g1, g2))
)
, (77)
where function I−(u), as defined in [25, Section 11.2], is∞ when u > 0 and zero otherwise. Note
that the change point ν is known at the follower, and thus g2 can be different before and after the
change time ν. The cost for the follower is the mean time to false alarm J2(g1, g2) , A(g1, g2)
as the follower wants to sabotage detection by making false alarm more frequent.
For our game, the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the leader and cost are defined as
follows. As [16, Definition 4.1], we define
Definition VI.1. Fix ε > 0. For any g1 ∈ G1, the set R2ε(g1) ⊆ G2 defined by
R2ε(g1) =
{
g2 ∈ G2 : J2(g1, g2) ≤ inf
ξ∈G2
J2(g1, ξ) + ε
}
(78)
is the ε-optimal response set of the follower to the strategy g1 of the leader.
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Definition VI.2. The Stackelberg cost of the leader is defined as
J1∗ = inf
g1∈G1
inf
ε>0
sup
g2∈R2ε(g1)
J1(g1, g2). (79)
For any ε > 0, a strategy g1∗ε ∈ G1 is an ε-Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the leader if
inf
ε¯>0
sup
g2∈R2ε¯(g
1∗
ε )
J1(g1∗ε , g2) ≤ J1∗ + ε
Based on the above definitions, we first prove the following lemma which results in the game
solution later in Theorem VI.1.
Lemma VI.1. For the binary BDQCD Stackelberg game, if there exists a pure strategy g´2 ∈ G2
that results in a lower bound J1(g1, g´2) ≥ η for any g1 ∈ G1, then
sup
g2∈R2ε(g1)
J1(g1, g2) ≥ J1(g1, g´2) ≥ η (80)
for any ε > 0.
Proof. We prove that supg2∈R2ε(g1) J
1(g1, g2) ≥ J1(g1, g´2). If g´2 ∈ R2ε(g1), then the inequality
is trivial. If not, for any g2 ∈ R2ε(g1) we have A(g1, g2) ≤ A(g1, g´2). If A(g1, g´2) < γ, then
J1(g1, g2) = J
1(g1, g´2) = ∞ from (77). Now consider A(g1, g´2) ≥ γ. If A(g1, g2) < γ ≤
A(g1, g´2), from (77),
J1(g1, g´2) ≤ J1(g1, g2) =∞.
Otherwise, if γ ≤ A(g1, g2) ≤ A(g1, g´2), then
I− (γ −A(g1, g´2)) = I− (γ −A(g1, g2)) = 0,
we construct an attack gˆ2 acting as g2 when ν = ∞ and as g´2 otherwise. This gˆ2 will lie
in R2ε(g1) and result in J
1(g1, gˆ2) = J
1(g1, g´2), which results in J
1(g1, g´2) = J
1(g1, gˆ2) ≤
supg2∈R2ε(g1) J
1(g1, g2).
Theorem VI.1. For the binary BDQCD Stackelberg game, the Stackelberg cost J1∗ is 1
(|N |−M)I
when |N | > M and zero elsewhere; and for any ε > 0, the |N |-voting rule is the ε-Stackelberg
equilibrium strategy for the leader.
Proof. From Lemma VI.1, for the converse J1∗ ≥ 1
(|N |−M)I it suffices to construct an attack g´2
such that for any g1 ∈ G1, we have
J1(g1, g´2) ≥ 1
(|N | −M)I , (81)
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when |N | > M . This is valid from the proof of Theorem IV.1 by choosing g´2 as the proposed
reverse attack. On the other hand, the achievability comes from (11). That is, the |N |-voting
rule, which uses only 1 bit from each sensor, achieves
max
g2∈R2ε
(
τs
(|N|)
(h)
) J1
(
τ s(|N |)(h), g2
)
=
1
(|N | −M)I , ∀ε > 0, (82)
by selecting local threshold h for the worst case attack (where all compromised sensors send
“1” always) such that
A(τ s(|N |)(h), g2) ≥ γ, ∀g2 ∈ R2ε
(
τ s(|N |)(h)
)
. (83)
Then J1∗ ≤ 1
(|N |−M)I
and it concludes the proof.
We now consider Q > 1 and define the multi-hypothesis BDQCD Stackelberg game. From the
detection delay defined in (5) and false alarm/isolation defined in (6), we define the corresponding
performance metrics under strategy (g1, g2) as
D(g1, g2) := sup
ν
sup
q∈[Q]
ess supEq,g2ν [(T − ν)+|Xν1]. (84)
A(g1, g2) := inf
q∈[Q]+
inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
E
q,g2
0 [T
qˆ]. (85)
Unfortunately in this case, we are unable to prove results similar to Lemma VI.1 with the
follower’s cost J2(g1, g2) = A(g1, g2). The main difficulty is that when ν = 0, one needs to
consider jointly the mean time to a false alarm and that to a false isolation, when it comes to
constructing an attack g´2. Therefore, we instead define J
2(g1, g2) = −J1(g1, g2) and show the
following result.
Theorem VI.2. For multi-hypothesis BDQCD Stackelberg game, the Stackelberg cost is J1∗ =
1
(|N |−M)I∗ when |N | > M and zero elsewhere; and for any ε > 0, the simultaneous |N |-th alarm
is the ε-Stackelberg equilibrium strategy for the leader.
Proof. In this case, J1∗ in (79) becomes
inf
g1∈G1
sup
g2∈G2
J1(g1, g2) (86)
If we can construct an attack g´2 such that for any g1 ∈ G1, J1(g1, g´2) ≥ 1(|N |−M)I , and then
supg2∈G2 J
1(g1, g2) ≥ J1(g1, g´2) ≥ 1(|N |−M)I by definition. The game solution simply follows
from the proof of Theorem V.1 and V.2 (a) by choosing g´2 as our reverse attack for the multi-
hypothesis case in Section V-B1.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the problem of BDQCD has been studied, where a fusion center sequentially
monitors an abrupt event via distributed sensors which might be compromised. Both the binary
hypothesis and multi-hypothesis cases have been considered. For the binary case, a novel converse
bound for the first-order asymptotic detection delay performance in the large mean time to a
false alarm regime has been proved. By comparing the converse bound and the first-order scaling
achieved by the existing consensus rule, we have characterized the fundamental limit of binary
BDQCD in the large mean time to a false alarm regime (or the small false alarm rate regime
in a sense). For the multi-hypothesis BDQCD, the novel converse has been generalized from
the binary case and the optimal first-order asymptotic performance has again been characterized.
Along with establishing this fundamental result, two novel families of stopping rules have been
proposed, namely the multi-shot d-th alarm and the simultaneous d-th alarm. The former is
much more energy-efficient and bandwidth efficient while the latter can achieve asymptotically
optimal performance under sufficient link bandwidth whenever there are more honest sensors than
compromised ones. Finally, a leader-follower Stackelberg game has been formulated based on
the BDQCD problem discussed. The asymptotically optimal stopping rule and the asymptotically
worst attack proposed for BDQCD have led us to the game solution, in which the leader adopts
the proposed asymptotically optimal stopping rule (i.e., the simultaneous rule) and the follower
employs the corresponding asymptotically worst attack.
APPENDIX A
LEMMAS
In this appendix, some useful lemmas are presented and their proofs are given.
Lemma A.1. For any decision rule T , ν ≥ 0, q ∈ [Q], and attack strategy g,
ess supEq,gν [(T − ν)+ | Xν1] = ess supEq,gν [T − ν | T > ν, Xν1]. (87)
Proof: For any decision rule T , ν ≥ 0, q ∈ [Q], and attack strategy g, consider the subset
S of RK×ν on which T > ν. By the definition of S, observe that
P
q,g
ν [T > ν | Xν1] =


1, on S,
0, on Sc.
(88)
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Also, note that Eq,gν [(T − ν)+ | Xν1] is well-defined on RK×ν, and by definition constantly zero
on Sc. On the other hand,
E
q,g
ν [T − ν | T > ν, Xν1] (89)
is well-defined only on S; specifically, since Pq,gν [T > ν | Xν1] = 0 on Sc, the conditional
probability needed to evaluate (89) is not well-defined on Sc.
Now, by the law of total expectation,
E
q,g
ν [(T − ν)+ | Xν1]
= Eq,gν [(T − ν)+ | T > ν, Xν1] Pq,gν [T > ν | Xν1]
+ Eq,gν [(T − ν)+ | T ≤ ν, Xν1] Pq,gν [T ≤ ν | Xν1]
= Eq,gν [T − ν | T > ν, Xν1] on S, (90)
where the last equality follows from (88). Since Eq,gν [(T − ν)+ | Xν1] is constantly zero on Sc,
the desired result is a direct consequence of (90).
Lemma A.2. In binary genie-aided BCQCD, for any general (not necessarily masked symmetric)
fusion rule T ′({Xt}t≥1), there is a masked symmetric rule T ({Xt}t≥1) that is not worse than
T ′({Xt}t≥1).
Proof: The proof is a constructive one. Recall we have defined π : [K] → [K] a masked
permutation function that permutes the first 2M entries while keeps the remaining |N |−M entries
unchanged. Let Π2M be the collection of all (2M ! in total) such π. For Xt = [X
1
t , . . . , X
K
t ], we
slightly abuse the notation to write π(Xt) = [X
π(1)
t , . . . , X
π(K)
t ]. Let
T ({Xt}t≥1) = 1
2M !
∑
π∈Π2M
T ′({π(Xt)}t≥1). (91)
Following the proof of part 1 of [14, Lemma 4.2], one can show that T ({Xt}t≥1) is indeed a
masked symmetric strategy. Now the detection delay Dgenie[T ({Xt}t≥1)] is
sup
s∈S,ν
ess supEsν
[(
1
2M !
∑
π∈Π2M
T ′({π(Xt)}t≥1)− ν
)+ ∣∣∣∣Xν1
]
.
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Thus Dgenie[T ({Xt}t≥1)] is no longer than
1
2M !
∑
π∈Π2M
sup
s∈S,ν
ess supEsν
[
(T ′({π(Xt)}t≥1)− ν)+|Xν1
]
(a)
=
1
2M !
∑
π∈Π2M
sup
s∈S,ν
ess supEs◦π
−1
ν
[
(T ′({Xt}t≥1)− ν)+|Xν1
]
(b)
=
1
2M !
∑
π∈Π2M
sup
s′∈S,ν
ess supEs
′
ν
[
(T ′({Xt}t≥1)− ν)+|Xν1
]
=
1
2M !
∑
π∈Π2M
Dgenie[T ′({Xt}t≥1)] = Dgenie[T ′({Xt}t≥1)]. (92)
Note that essential supremum of the right-hand side of (a) is taken under the probability measure
whose density is specified by (17) under θ = 0 and the compromised group assignment s ◦ π−1.
Then (a) can be proved similar to (21a) by the fact
E
s
ν
[
(T ′({π(Xt)}t≥1)− ν)+
∣∣∣ Xν1] (x) =
E
s◦π−1
ν
[
(T ′({Xt}t≥1)− ν)+
∣∣∣ Xν1] (π(x)), ∀x ∈ RK×ν
since the permutation π(.) is one-to-one; and (b) is due to the fact that {s◦π−1|s ∈ S} = S. We
can similarly show that for the mean time to false alarm of the new rule, Agenie[T ({Xt}t≥1)] ≥
Agenie[T ′({Xt}t≥1)]. Then we conclude that the masked symmetric strategy T ({Xt}t≥1) is at
least as good as T ′({Xt}t≥1).
Lemma A.3. In multiple-hypothesis genie-aided BCQCD, for any general (not necessarily
masked symmetric) fusion rule T ′({Xt}t≥1), there is a masked symmetric rule T ({Xt}t≥1) that
has longer mean time to a false alarm or a false isolation than T ′({Xt}t≥1).
Proof: Again, the symmetrized rule T is formed as (91) in the binary BCQCD. It is obvious
40
that
Agenie[T ] = inf
q∈[Q]+
inf
s∈S
inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
E
q,s
0 [T
qˆ({Xt}t≥1)]
= inf
q∈[Q]+
inf
s∈S
inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
E
q,s
0
[
1
2M !
∑
π∈Π2M
T ′qˆ({π(Xt)}t≥1)
]
≥ 1
2M !
∑
π∈Π2M
inf
q∈[Q]+
inf
s∈S
inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
E
q,s
0
[
T ′qˆ({π(Xt)}t≥1)
]
=
1
2M !
∑
π∈Π2M
inf
q∈[Q]+
inf
s∈S
inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
E
q,s◦π−1
0
[
T ′qˆ({Xt}t≥1)
]
=
1
2M !
∑
π∈Π2M
inf
q∈[Q]+
inf
s′∈S
inf
qˆ∈[Q]\{q}
E
q,s′
0
[
T ′qˆ({Xt}t≥1)
]
=
1
2M !
∑
π∈Π2M
Agenie[T ′] = Agenie[T ′]. (93)
As a remark, the above proof generalizes that for the mean time to false alarm part for the binary
BCQCD which is omitted in Lemma A.2.
Lemma A.4. For any centralized multi-sensor and (Q + 1)-hypothesis QCD rule T˜ , subject to
A[T˜ ] ≥ γ, the detection delay is lower-bounded by
D[T˜ ] & log γ
I˜∗
, as γ →∞,
where I˜∗ is defined in (44).
Proof: One can follow the same arguments in the proof of [6, Theorem 2] to show this
Lemma. Specifically, for any q ∈ [Q], take an arbitrary εq ∈ (0, 1). We extend the sequence of
additional stopping variables T˜a,0 := 0 < T˜a,1 < T˜a,2 < ... introduced in the beginning of the
proof of [6, Theorem 2] into multi-sensor version as
T˜a,i+1 = max
q∈[Q]
T˜ qa,i+1,
T˜ qa,i+1 = inf
{
n ≥ T˜i + 1 :
P˜q(X˜T˜i+1)...P˜q(X˜n)
P˜0(X˜T˜i+1)...P˜0(X˜n)
≤ εq
}
.
Then the rest of the proof simply follows [6].
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION V.1
To prove (58) and (60), we note that in the worst case, all the compromised sensors can
raise alarms about the same hypothesis continuously. This implies that as soon as d − M ,
d ∈ {M + 1, ..., |N |}, honest sensors raise alarms of the same hypothesis, the compromised
sensors can cooperatively enforce a false alarm event. If the fusion center stops only once, for
the false isolation, it may declare the correct decision before the first σqˆ(d−M)(h) for τ
m
(d)(h) (or
S qˆd−M(h) for τ
s
(d)(h)) and then T
qˆ =∞ in (6), which results in a lower bound instead of equality
in (58) (and (60)). When the fusion center stops multiple times, recall that in both τd(h) and
τ s(d)(h), the fusion center resets local CUSUM matrices of all sensors to the all zero matrix after
each stop time. The mean of false alarm or isolation time T qˆ of τd(h) (respectively τ
s
(d)(h))
is clearly lower bounded by that obtained by applying τd(h) (respectively τ
s
(d)(h)) but without
reset, which corresponds to the right hand side of (58) (respectively (60)).
For the detection delay (5), the worst-case attack G for both the proposed stopping algorithms
happens when all compromised sensors always output local decisions corresponding to H0.
Moreover, we note that both the global decision rules mentioned above are non-decreasing
functions in each entry of local CUSUM matirx Y kt (q, j) in (8) and the worst CUSUM statistic
that the pre-change observations can impose is Y kt (q, j) = 0, t ≤ ν. Hence, for the proposed
algorithms, in the worst case, T is not a function of previous observations and Lemma 3 in [13]
can be applied to show the equivalence between (5) and
D[T ] = sup
q∈[Q]
sup
g
E
q,g
0 [T ], (94)
which corresponds to the scenario where the change occurs at t = 0. We therefore only have to
consider as the worst-case expected detection delay in the sequel. For mulit-shot D[τm(d)(h)] in
(59), the fusion center has to wait for d honest sensors accepting the true Hq. However, false
isolation qf 6= q may still happens if σq′(d)(h) < σq(d)(h), q′ ∈ [Q] \ {q}. Moreover, the longest
extra delay caused by ties is Q − 1. Thus we have the upper-bound in (59). The upper-bound
for simultaneous D[τ s(d)(h)] in (61) can be obtained similarly.
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APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA V.1
Fix q ∈ [Q] and k ∈ N . For any j ∈ [Q]+ with j 6= q, the CUSUM statistics Y kt (q, j) at
sensor k can be decomposed as Y kt (q, j) = Z
k
t (q, j) + ξ
k
t (q, j), where
Zkt (q, j) :=
t∑
s=1
log
(
Pq(X
k
s )
Pj(Xks )
)
, ξkt (q, j) := − min
0≤s<t
Zks (q, j).
Under Pq, Z
k(q, j) is a random walk with drift I(q, j) > 0 and variance σ2(q, j) < ∞. It
follows that Zkt (q), defined as (Z
k
t (q, 1), . . . , Z
k
t (q, q − 1), Zkt (q, 0), Zkt (q, q + 1), . . . , Zkt (q, Q)),
is a Q-dimensional random walk. Also Y kt (q), which is similarly defined as Z
k
t (q) by replacing
Zkt (q, j) with Y
k
t (q, j), is a Q-dimensional perturbed random walk, as discussed in [26, Section
6.10]4.
Now for any j ∈ [Q]+ with j /∈ {q, j∗q}, at time index σq,j
∗
q
k (h) in (62), the CUSUM statistics
for hypotheses (q, j)
Y k
σ
q,j∗q
k
(h)
(q, j)
h
→ I(q, j)
I(q, j∗q )
=
I(q, j)
Iq
as h→∞, Pq-a.s.,
by [26, Theorem 10.1, p.206]. This, together with Assumption V.1, implies that it holds Pq-a.s.
that ∀j ∈ [Q]+ \ {q, j∗q}
Y k
σ
q,j∗q
k
(h)
(q, j)
h
> 1, (95)
as h is large enough. Now, observe that from (56), σqk(h) = inf
{
t ∈ N : min0≤j≤Q, j 6=q Y kt (q, j) ≥ h
}
,
and the RHS equals to
inf
{
t ∈ N : min
0≤j≤Q, j /∈{q,j∗q }
Y kt (q, j) ≥ h and Y kt (q, j∗q ) ≥ h
}
= σ
q,j∗q
k (h), as h is large enough, Pq-a.s.,
where the last line follows from (95). Since this relation is true for all k ∈ N and N is a finite
set, we conclude that σqk(h) = σ
q,j∗q
k (h) for all k ∈ N as h is large enough, Pq-a.s. This concludes
the proof for part (i).
4Note that while the exposition in [26, Section 6.10] focuses on two-dimensional perturbed random walks, the same results
there can be generalized to multi-dimensional cases as stated in [26, Remark 10.1, p. 208].
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For part (ii), from (57), Sqd(h) is equal to
inf
{
t ∈ N : min
0≤j≤Q, j 6=q
Y kt (q, j) ≥ h ∀k ∈ L,
for some L ⊂ [N ], |L| = d}.
Then from (95), Sqd(h) becomes
inf
{
t ∈ N :Y kt (q, j∗q ) ≥ h ∀k ∈L, for someL⊂ [N ], |L|=ℓ
}
= inf
{
t ∈ N : Y (K−d+1)t (q, j∗q ) ≥ h
}
.
Then as h→∞, Pq-a.s. we have Sqd(h) = S
q,j∗q
d (h).
APPENDIX D
PROOFS OF THEOREMS V.3 AND V.4
We first prove Theorem V.3.
Proof: Fix a 1 ≤ d ≤ |N |. From [15, Theorem 3.1], we know that as h→∞,
E
q,∅
0 [σ
q,j∗q
(d) (h)] =
h
Iq
+Dqd:|N |
√
h(1 + o(1)). (96)
Since σq(d)(h) and σ
q,j∗q
(d) (h) are both nonnegative and non-decreasing in h, the monotone conver-
gence theorem yields
lim
h→∞
E
q,∅
0 [σ
q
(d)(h)] = E
q,∅
0
[
lim
h→∞
σq(d)(h)
]
= Eq,∅0
[
lim
h→∞
σ
q,j∗q
(d) (h)
]
= lim
h→∞
E
q,∅
0
[
σ
q,j∗q
(d) (h)
]
, (97)
where the second equality follows from Part (i) of Lemma V.1. The above two equations together
show (64). Finally, plugging (64) into (59) and observing that Q− 1 vanishes as h→∞ results
in (65).
We then provide a proof to Theorem V.4.
Proof: Fix a 1 ≤ d ≤ |N |. From [15, Theorem 3.2], it follows that as h→∞,
E
q,∅
0 [S
q,j∗q
d (h)] ≤
h
Iq
+Dqd:|N |
√
h(1 + o(1)). (98)
Since Sqd(h) and S
q,j∗q
d (h) are both nonnegative and non-decreasing in h, the monotone conver-
gence theorem yields
lim
h→∞
E
q,∅
0 [S
q
d(h)] = E
q,∅
0
[
lim
h→∞
Sqd(h)
]
= Eq,∅0
[
lim
h→∞
S
q,j∗q
d (h)
]
= lim
h→∞
E
q,∅
0
[
S
q,j∗q
d (h)
]
, (99)
where the second equality follows from Part (ii) of Lemma V.1. The previous two equations
together then give (66). Finally, plugging (66) into (61) results in (67).
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APPENDIX E
PROOFS OF THEOREMS V.5 AND V.6
We first provide a proof to Theorem V.5.
Proof: We assume that whenever a tie happens, every competing hypothesis becomes
acceptable simultaneously at the fusion center. This would only make the mean time to a false
alarm or a false isolation smaller; hence, is valid for deriving lower bounds.
Let qa be the actual hypothesis index and
q∗ = arg min
qˆ∈[Q]\{qa}
E
qa,∅
0 [σ
qˆ
(d−M)(h)]. (100)
Recall that P
qa,∅
0 is the probability measure when the change of type Hqa happens at ν = 0 and
the compromised sensors are absent. With a fixed d, we have
E
qa,∅
0 [σ˜
q∗
(d−M)(h)] =
∞∑
t=0
P
qa,∅
0
(
σ˜q
∗
(d−M)(h) > t
)
. (101)
Now, let Nq(s) , {k ∈ N : σqk(h) ≤ s} be the set of honest sensor indices with σqk(h) ≤ s. For
every t ∈ N, the event σq∗(d−M)(h) ≤ t happens if and only if the following is true,
t⋃
s=1
{(
Q⋂
q 6=q∗
|Nq(s)| < d−M
)⋂{|Nq∗(s)| ≥ d−M}
}
. (102)
Then, we have
P
qa,∅
0
(
σq
∗
(d−M)(h) ≤ t
)
≤ Pqa,∅0
(
t⋃
s=1
|Nq∗(s)| ≥ d−M
)
= Pqa,∅0 (|Nq∗(t)| ≥ d−M) (103)
Also, we know that |Nq∗(t)| ≥ d−M happens if and only if there are sensor indices k1, . . . , kd−M ∈
N with σq∗kj (h) ≤ t for j ∈ [d−M ]. We further bound (103) by union bound as follows,
P
qa,∅
0 (|Nq∗(t)| ≥ d−M) ≤
∑
k1,...,kd−M∈N
P
qa,∅
0
(
d−M⋂
j=1
σq
∗
kj
(h) ≤ t
)
=
∑
k1,...,kd−M∈N
d−M∏
j=1
P
qa,∅
0
(
σq
∗
kj
(h) ≤ t
)
=

 |N |
d−M

(Pqa,∅0 (σq∗1 (h) ≤ t))d−M . (104)
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where the first and second equalities are from the independent and identical distributions of
different sensor observations, respectively.
Note that from the definition of matrix CUSUM in (56), it follows that
P
qa,∅
0
(
σq
∗
1 (h) ≤ t
)
= Pqa,∅0
(
t⋃
s=1
{{
Y 1s,q∗ ≥ h, q∗ = arg max
q′∈[Q]
Y 1t,q′
} s−1⋂
s′=1
max
q′∈[Q]
Y 1s′,q′ < h
})
≤
t∑
s=1
P
qa,∅
0
({
Y 1s,q∗ ≥ h, q∗ = arg max
q′∈[Q]
Y 1t,q′
} s−1⋂
s′=1
max
q′∈[Q]
Y 1s′,q′ < h
)
≤
t∑
s=1
P
qa,∅
0
(
Y 1s,q∗ ≥ h
)
=
t∑
s=1
P
qa,∅
0
( ⋂
0≤j≤Q,j 6=q∗
Y 1s (q
∗, j) ≥ h
)
≤
t∑
s=1
P
qa,∅
0
(
Y 1s (q
∗, 0) ≥ h) . (105)
Now, we know from [19] that P
qa,∅
0 (Y
1
s (q
∗, 0) ≥ h) ≤ e−h. Thus, from (104) and (105), we have
P
qa,∅
0
(
σq
∗
(d−M)(h) ≤ t
)
≤

 |N |
d−M

 td−Me−(d−M)h. (106)
Plugging (106) into (101) results in
E
qa,∅
0 [σ
q∗
(d−M)(h)] >
∞∑
t=0

1−

 |N |
d−M

 td−Me−(d−M)h


+
≥
∫ ∞
0

1−

 |N |
d−M

 td−Me−(d−M)h


+
dt, (107)
where the second inequality comes from the non-increasing property in t of
1−

 |N |
d−M

 td−Me−(d−M)h. (108)
Finally, noticing that the lower bound in (107) is not a function of the actual hypothesis qa
concludes the proof of A[τm(d)(h)].
In what follows, we present a proof to Theorem V.6.
Proof: Again, let qa be the actual hypothesis and let
q∗ = arg min
qˆ∈[Q]\{qa}
E
qa,∅
0 [S
qˆ
d−M(h)]. (109)
With a fixed d, we have
E
qa,∅
0 [S
q∗
(d−M)(h)] =
∞∑
t=0
P
qa,∅
0
(
S q
∗
(d−M)(h) > t
)
. (110)
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Note that for every t ∈ N, the event S q∗(d−M)(h) ≤ t happens if and only if the following event
is true,
t⋃
s=1
{(
Q⋂
q 6=q∗
Y (K−(d−M)+1)s,q < h
)⋂
Y
(K−(d−M)+1)
s,q∗ ≥ h
}
. (111)
Then, we have
P
qa,∅
0
(
S q
∗
(d−M)(h) ≤ t
)
≤ Pqa,∅0
(
t⋃
s=1
Y
(K−(d−M)+1)
s,q∗ ≥ h
)
≤
t∑
s=1
P
qa,∅
0
(
Y
(K−(d−M)+1)
s,q∗ ≥ h
)
(112)
Also, we know that event Y
(K−(d−M)+1)
s,q∗ ≥ h happens if and only if there are d −M sensors
with indexes k1, . . . , kd−M ∈ N which have local decisions q∗ at time index s. Therefore,
P
qa,∅
0
(
Y
(K−(d−M)+1)
s,q∗ ≥ h
)
=
∑
k1,...,kd−M∈N
d−M∏
j=1
P
∅
qa
(
Y
kj
s,q∗ ≥ h
)
=

 |N |
d−M

(Pqa,∅0 (Y 1s,q∗ ≥ h) )d−M (113)
where the first and second equalities are from the independent and identical distributions of
different sensor observations, respectively. Now as in (105), it follows that
P
qa,∅
0
(
Y 1s,q∗ ≥ h
) ≤ Pqa,∅0 (Y 1s (q∗, 0) ≥ h) ≤ e−h (114)
Thus, from (112)-(114),
P
qa,∅
0
(
S q
∗
(d−M)(h) ≤ t
)
≤

 |N |
d−M

 te−(d−M)h. (115)
Plugging (115) into (110) and noticing that the bound in (115) is independent of qa completes
the proof for the lower bound on A(τ s(d)(h)).
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